Regulating the Attention Economy: The Possibilities and Limits of Antitrust

With the rapid expansion of digital technologies in recent years, the “attention economy” has attracted the interest of academics and policymakers. At the same time, the rise of the neo-Brandeisian approach to antitrust has caused regulatory bodies to investigate the market power of technology companies. This article analyzes the role of antitrust in the attention economy. First, it defends user autonomy as the standard for antitrust regulation, and second, it argues that facilitating competition must not be the orienting goal for regulating markets of attention that threaten user autonomy. Enhancing competition without restraints on the practices of technology companies within those markets is not only insufficient to address the fundamental harms to user autonomy that result from the attention economy, but may, in practice, exacerbate these harms. To address the problems of the attention economy, regulators must establish meaningful ex ante restrictions on the practices of technology companies within the digital economy, and legislation that centers the autonomy of the user.