Disinformation, deterrence and the politics of attribution

This article unpacks the politics of disinformation attribution as deterrence. Research and policy on disinformation deterrence commonly draw on frameworks inspired by cyber deterrence to address the ‘attribution problem’, thereby overlooking the political aspects underpinning attribution strategies in liberal democracies. Addressing this gap and bringing together disinformation studies and the fourth wave of deterrence theory, the article examines how acts of attribution serve liberal states’ attempts at deterring foreign influence operations. In liberal states, disinformation as an external threat intersects with essential processes of public deliberation, and acts of attribution are charged with political risk. Introducing the concept of the ‘uncertainty loop’, the article demonstrates how the flow of uncertainty charges the decision-making situation in disinformation attribution. Drawing on three contemporary empirical cases—interference in the US presidential election of 2016, the Bundestag election in Germany in 2021 and the EU response to the COVID-19 ‘infodemic’ which erupted in 2020, the article illustrates how diverse strategies of attribution, non-attribution and diffused attribution have been navigated by governments. By laying bare the politics of disinformation attribution and advancing a conceptual apparatus for understanding its variations, the article expands current knowledge on disinformation deterrence and speaks to a broader International Relations literature on how deterrence strategies are mediated through political contexts.