This study examines whether and how Iranian Telegram channels coordinated to disseminate propaganda and disinformation during the 12-day Israel – Iran war (13–24 June 2025). Building on digital repression and computational propaganda research that remains Twitter-centric mainly, the analysis centers on Telegram and includes channel types typically treated as nonpolitical intermediaries. A dataset of 47,567 posts from 29 channels was collected and analyzed using a mixed-methods design integrating natural language processing, social network analysis of co-posting ties, and rhetorical analysis. The results reveal a highly saturated coordination network in which political-news outlets acted as key hubs, but entertainment channels also occupied structurally central positions. Proxy and entertainment channels formed an amplification layer that, to a great extent, repeatedly reproduced regime-aligned narratives. Disinformation was less prevalent than propaganda, yet replication was frequent and often packaged in humorous or sarcastic terms, enabling message diffusion to broader audiences. The findings show how infrastructural and leisure-oriented channels can be incorporated into wartime influence operations in authoritarian settings.
